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DIVIDED SUFFRAGE
Jeffrey Rosen*
The biggest constitutional mistake? As the recent wave of
constitution-making in Eastern Europe suggests, future Solons
and Lycurguses aren't likely to be very interested in quibbling
over the details of a Bill of Rights. Instead, the critical question
is how to structure democratic elections. And on this point, the
most misguided provision in the U.S. Constitution is not the
Electoral College, which remains theoretically mystifying but
hasn't bothered anyone for more than a century. Far worse are
sections 2 and 4 of Article I, and (if I'm allowed more than one
villain) section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which divide responsibility for defining the nature and scope of suffrage between
Congress and the states. This unfortunate compromise, more
than any other, is responsible for all the most traumatic electoral
crises since Reconstruction.
"To have reduced the different qualifications in the different
States to one uniform rule would probably have been as dissatisfactory to some of the States as it would have been difficult to the
convention," Madison explained apologetically in Federalist 52.
Allowing the states to restrict the suffrage in different ways was
the only politically feasible compromise, because "it cannot be
feared that the people of the States will alter this part of their
constitutions in such a manner as to abridge the rights secured to
them by the federal Constitution."
But of course, abridging federal constitutional rights is precisely what the states proceeded to do in their decisions restricting the suffrage in the nineteenth century and manipulating
electoral districts in the twentieth. Maybe there was some logic
for allowing states to exclude broad classes of voters in 1789,
when only propertied, educated citizens were thought capable of
casting informed votes; but in an age when uniform as well as
universal suffrage has been embraced as a national ideal, it
makes little sense to tolerate a patchwork of inconsistent and parochial state restrictions.
•
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More fundamentally, the constitutional tragedy of the postReconstruction era-the subversion of African American suffrage by the states-could have been avoided if the Reconstruction Republicans had granted Congress plenary control over the
franchise, as Senator Jacob Howard and Congressman George
Boutwell proposed. Imagine how the racial politics of the next
century might have been transformed if the Committee on Reconstruction had endorsed Boutwell's draft of the Fourteenth
Amendment ("Congress shall have the power to abolish any distinction in the exercise of the elective franchise in any State,
which by law, regulation or usage may exist therein"), or Howard's draft ("Congress shall have power to make all laws necessary and proper to secure to all citizens of the United States in
each State the same political and elective rights and privileges .... ").1 Instead, by refusing to displace the states' control
over the franchise, and by compounding the error with section 2
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Reconstruction Congress
paved the way for the nullification of the Fifteenth Amendment
in the 1890s, as defiant states restricted black suffrage with literacy tests, grandfather clauses, dual registration requirements, and
so forth.
Similarly, the great redistricting crises of the twentieth century-malapportionment, partisan gerrymandering, and the confusion over race-conscious districting-might have been avoided
or moderated if States had been stripped of their powers to draw
congressional districts. The pressures on redistricting were not
apparent until the rapid population growth after 1850, when the
contrast between city and country became increasingly dramatic.
But gross malapportionment might have been less likely to persist for more than a century if landed interests hadn't been free
to lobby self-interested state legislators, with the results that
Hamilton predicted in Federalist 60. And, the implementation of
the Voting Rights Act might have been less tortured if self-interested state legislators hadn't been free to balance the irreconcilable goals of incumbency protection and proportionate racial
representation with the inflexible requirements of population
based districting.
The solution for future constitution makers? Giving Congress exclusive control over the franchise wouldn't entirely solve
the problem, since the siren calls of self-dealing and incumbency
protection would still be hard to resist. What's needed is to tie
1. Benjamin B. Kendrick, The JoU1711ll of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Recon·
struction 54-55 (Colum. U. Press, 1914).
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Ulysses to the mast with some kind of pre-commitment strategy.
Perhaps the solution would be to delegate power over suffrage
and districting to an administrative body that is less vulnerable to
partisan interests. One model is the independent commission responsible for making recommendations to Congress about military base closings, whose recommendations must be accepted or
rejected as a package. Another is the Federal Reapportionment
Act of 1929, which charged the President with reporting to Congress the state-by-state results of the decennial census, together
with strictly a numerical apportionment of representatives, and
delegated responsibility for certifying the apportionment to the
clerk of the House of Representatives.2
Should the national election laws be constitutionalized? "It
will not be alleged that an election law could have been framed
and inserted in the Constitution which would have been applicable to every probable change in the situation of the country,"
Hamilton said in Federalist 59. But why not? Today, many countries have inserted election laws into their constitutions, including Australia, Belgium, Canada, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy,
Mexico, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland.3
The best argument against constitutionalizing the national election laws is that the national legislature should be free to experiment with proportional and mixed representation systems; and
experimentation is more difficult once the laws are entrenched.
So perhaps the institutional arrangements for adopting and
amending election laws, but not the laws themselves, should be
specified in the Constitution. Blue Ribbon commissions, fast
track legislation-there are plenty of possibilities. Just make
sure to exclude the states as ruthlessly as possible.

2. See, e.g., Samuel lssacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political Fairness, 71 Tex. L Rev. 1643, 1665 (1993).
3. Andrzej Rapaczynski, Constitutional Politics in Poland: A Repon on the Constitutional Committee of the Polish Parliament, 58 U. Chi. L Rev. 595, 622 & n. 51 (1991).

